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Governing at arm’s length: Eroding or enhancing democracy? 
Introduction 
This review article challenges the prevailing view that the use of quangos, non-majoritarian 
institutions, agencies and other forms of arm’s length governance is necessarily counter-
democratic and a poor substitute for direct control by elected politicians.  We consider 
important theoretical and policy questions about the extent to which organising state 
functions in this way closes off policy sectors into private realms that exhibit a democratic 
deficit, or offers democratic enhancement by fostering new forms of public influence and 
deliberation.  We argue that conventional state-centric models of representative politics still 
dominate the way in which arm’s length governance is understood.  Even the notions of 
‘quasi-governmental’ organisations and ‘arm’s length’ agencies presuppose that authority 
and legitimacy flow out from elected politicians, reciprocated by a singular line of 
accountability back to them.  Yet from a theoretical perspective there are other ways of 
thinking about the place of such bodies in systems of democratic governance and individuals 
working in such organisations clearly see multiple forms of accountability arising from the 
networks of relationships in which they are embedded (Newman, 2004; Acar, et al, 2008; 
Jeffares and Skelcher, 2011).  
We use the generic term ‘arm’s length bodies’ (ALBs) to refer to a broad class of 
organisations that undertake a variety of public functions that otherwise could be located in 
a government department/ministry.  These include policy development, resource allocation, 
service delivery, regulation, and adjudication (table 1).   The main characteristic of these 
bodies is their relative autonomy from elected politicians in the way they exercise their 
functions.  Conventionally, they are regarded as ‘further out’ from political control than 
ministries (Greve, et al, 1999; Pollitt, et al, 2001).  However this class of organisations 
exhibits wide variety in their governance, as we illustrate in our article, leading Gill (2002) to 
characterise them as an ‘organisational zoo’.   
--------- Table 1 about here --------- 
The dominant ‘democratic deficit’ perspective on ALBs derives from the agency problems 
generated by political delegation (Elgie, 2006; Vibert, 2007; Bertelli, 2012).  The theory 
Revised Manuscript (track changes accepted)
2 
 
proposes that as politicians delegate functions out to agencies, so information asymmetry 
increases and there is a consequent loss of transparency and reduction in accountability. 
This creates space for opportunistic, self-interested behaviour on the part of arm’s length 
bodies, further accentuating the democratic deficit in comparison with functions that are 
retained under the direct control of elected politicians. From this perspective, the 
benchmark for assessing democratic quality is the politically-headed bureau within a system 
of representative democracy.  Thus, democratic quality is eroded as governments respond 
to new public management incentives to delegate to third parties.   
If we set agency theory to one side and look at ALBs from the viewpoint of pluralism and 
polycentrism, then the democratic implications are somewhat different.   From a pluralist 
perspective, agencies provide a means of reducing the privatism of elite partisan bargaining 
by protecting the participation rights of actors who otherwise would be marginalised 
(Bellamy, 2010).  Such actor involvement may reflect the way in which the body is formally 
constituted to incorporate representatives of affected publics, for example the integration 
councils established by Danish municipalities (Skelcher, et al, 2013), or its specific functional 
responsibility, such as the UK’s Equalities and Human Rights Commission.  Ostrom’s (1990) 
work on polycentric political institutions complements this insight by recognising that self-
organisation amongst smaller sets of publics may provide an effective way of resolving 
collective action problems, and thus facilitating a democratic ethos.  Thus ALBs have the 
potential for democratic enhancement through mechanisms that Fung (2001) has termed 
‘accountable autonomy’ – continuous, direct and empowered participation by citizens and 
others in arenas that enable deliberative decision-making.   
There are three reasons why it is important to debate the democracy eroding vs. democracy 
enhancing consequences of arm’s length governance.  First, the exercise of public authority 
through ALBs is a common and largely indispensible feature of contemporary governance 
(OECD, 2002; Verhoest, et al, 2010).  National governments have caught what Pollitt et al 
(2001) term 'agency fever', and at the sub-national level various forms of collaborative, 
network and private governance play a significant role in determining and/or delivering 
public programmes (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002).  More recently, there has been a growth 
in trans-national institutions, especially in the economic and security fields - some created 
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by upward delegation from nation states and others through self-organisation by non-state 
actors (Hall and Biersteker, 2002; Mattli and Büthe, 2005; Vibert, 2007).   
Secondly, the contemporary questioning of the relationship between state and citizen has 
been conducted in the context of a search for new institutional arrangements.  In the UK 
and elsewhere, government’s desire to divest its responsibilities has created an array of 
initiatives to empower, activate, and induce citizens, businesses, nonprofits and 
communities to play a fuller role in public governance (Cornwall, 2004; Clarke, 2005; 
Brannan, et al, 2006; Durose, et al, 2009).  Citizens are no longer perceived as the passive 
recipient of public benefits but rather as an active part of a common solution to social 
problems, bringing ‘experiential expertise’ and ‘local knowledge’ (Taylor 2003; Yanow, 2004; 
Brannan, et al, 2006; Barnes, et al, 2008;). This approach has particular relevance in meeting 
the needs of a super-diverse society (Griffiths, et al, 2009) and in addressing so-called 
‘wicked’ issues (Horne and Shirley, 2009: 25). 
Finally, the study of ALBs is fragmented across academic fields, but with little intellectual or 
empirical cross-fertilisation.  It has exercised scholars of the European Union (Majone, 1998; 
Gilardi, 2008;) and US federal agencies (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999; Huber and Shipan, 
2002), as well as urban political scientists (Sørensen, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005; Klijn and 
Skelcher, 2007; Davies, 2011).  There is considerable opportunity further to advance the 
field through greater intellectual connectivity.  In the next section, we consider the problem 
of democratic deficit in more detail, followed by an examination of the democracy 
enhancing perspective.  The article then explores the conditions that are necessary to 
activate citizens to engage with arm’s length governance.  Our conclusion develops the 
normative implications for the design of public governance. 
 
Delegation, discretion and democratic deficits 
The dominant perspective views arm’s length governance as a product of delegation: a 
political principal passes some of their authority to an administrative agent who has 
discretion in how this is exercised.  There are a number of reasons why such delegation 
might be of benefit (van Thiel, 2004; Elgie, 2006).  From the principal’s perspective, 
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delegation through patronage appointment improves their political security because it 
locks-in support through ties of mutual obligation, sometimes reinforced by permitting 
agents to take advantage of rent-seeking opportunities offered by their office (Bearfield, 
2009).  Such personal patronage also enhances deliverability of the principal’s policy goals 
by privileging political responsiveness over neutral competence in bureaucrat recruitment 
(Peters, 2009). However the power of patronage has been moderated in a number of 
countries by the introduction of an ‘advise and consent’ relationship with the legislature or 
creation of an independent appointments commission (Flinders, 2009; Pond, 2008).  Finally, 
it offers the benefit of what Hamman, et al (2010) term ‘moral wriggle room’ (see also: 
Weimar, 2006) enabling the principal to engage in blame-shifting should problems arise in 
the execution of the function, particularly if the instrumental purpose of delegation is that 
the agent should take morally dubious actions that the principal is unwilling explicitly to 
sanction. 
From a societal perspective, delegation to semi-autonomous agencies is beneficial as a 
mechanism to increase the credibility of political commitments in the face of time 
inconsistent preferences generated by short term electoral pressures (Elgie and 
McMenamin, 2005; Gilardi, 2008; Knott and Miller, 2005). Self-binding by delegating 
decisions is particularly relevant in policy sectors where the need for longer-run stability is 
important, as in the case of the increasing independence of central banks to manage 
interest rates.  A credible commitment to good (as defined by the market) economic 
management thus requires a trustee to stand in for the politician so that other preferences 
do not deflect from this course, hence reducing the level of moral hazard.  
However, there is evidence that the practical rationale for central bank independence and 
other forms of delegation are driven as much by isomorphic pressures in a globalised 
environment as by commitment credibility (McNamara, 2002; van Thiel, 2004).  Put bluntly, 
the imperatives of new public management promote the withdrawal of politicians from 
detailed involvement in policy domains.  Burnham (2001: 128) argues that since the early 
1990s de-politicisation has been a governing strategy in UK economic policy - ‘a process of 
placing at one remove the political character of decision-making’ - a line of argument 
developed by Davies (2011) in relation to urban governance, although from a different 
5 
 
theoretical perspective.  The extent and nature of de-politicisation, however, is a matter of 
debate (e.g. Kettell, 2008) and empirical analysis shows political ideology is also a 
determinant of delegation to arm's length bodies (Bertelli, 2006).   
Whatever the motivation for delegation to quasi-independent bodies, its effect is to reframe 
certain classes of decision as being technical in nature and thus best determined by experts 
rather than being matters of contestation between values in the political process. 
Consequently it affects the construction of the boundary between public and private realms, 
and thus the degree to which particular matters are regarded as legitimately available for 
public debate and influence. This issue is at the heart of the democratic deficit that arm’s 
length governance is claimed to exhibit.   
Methodologically, democratic deficit is a measure of the extent to which the structures and 
procedures of quasi-independent bodies conform to the standards expected of 
representative government (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007).  Such analysis, when applied to 
arm’s length governance, will inevitably produce a gap, as scholars of EU and global 
institutions have pointed out (Bellamy, 2010; Majone, 1998, 2010; Pogge, 1997).  They make 
the point that an analogy with national governmental practices is flawed due to the special 
conditions informing the design of non-majoritarian institutions.  Moravscik (2004) proposes 
an alternative realist methodology: that if particular forms of arm’s length governance are 
broadly accepted as legitimate by citizens, then similar institutional arrangements at trans-
national level should be given the benefit of the doubt.   Menon and Weatherill (2008) go 
further, arguing that the two primary appointed institutions of the EU – the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice – promote the legitimacy of the Union by 
ensuring that member states embed legally enforceable obligations in respect of the 
interests of actors who are marginalized in national political systems.   
If this is the case, then we need to change our conceptualisation of arm’s length governance 
as a ‘state of agents’ (Heinrich, et al, 2010) that principals find hard to control.  Some US 
scholars, for example, refer to independent regulatory agencies as the ‘fourth branch’ of 
government, sitting alongside legislature, executive and judiciary (Yackee, 2006). Majone 
(1998) proposes that it is heuristically useful to think of EU institutions in that way, and by 
extension this could be applied to arm’s length bodies more generally.  If they are a fourth 
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branch, then their legitimacy and accountability need to be considered in this light rather 
than as a poor relation to politically headed government bureaux.  As Klijn and Skelcher 
(2007) have argued in relation to governance networks, such extra-governmental 
institutions offer routes through which particular constituencies can gain access to political 
resources and thus enhance the degree of pluralism in a society or policy sector.  These 
issues are particularly pertinent given the continuing development and increasing impact of 
globalised forms of non-state governance (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2003; 
O'Rourke, 2003). 
 
Polycentrism, self-organisation and democracy enhancement 
Building a theory of democracy enhancing arm’s length governance takes us away from the 
state-centric, principal-agent framework and towards the polycentric and pluralist model of 
self-organising jurisdictions (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2012; Ostrom, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom, et al, 1961) (see Table 2).  From this perspective, diversity in governing 
arrangements arises from the bottom up, an acknowledgement that bounded rationality 
limits the power of centralised governance to satisfy the diverse needs of a society (Ostrom, 
1999).  In fact, the best known exponent of a polycentric perspective argued explicitly that 
such an understanding offered the best way to approach the design of specifically 
democratic governing arrangements (Ostrom, 1989). Thus polycentric theory asks how 
diverse and complex governing arrangements can be used to deepen and extend 
democracy, in contrast to agency theory which focuses on how to mitigate the 
democratically deleterious effects of sovereign delegation. 
 
------------------------- Table 2 about here -------------------- 
 
The polycentric perspective is grounded in a U.S. political tradition that takes local self-
determination rather than the central state – Leviathan or Gargantua – as its starting point 
for designing and legitimating arrangements for collective action. The core principle of 
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polycentric institutional design is to maximise both individuals' and groups' self-
determination in deciding on the nature and scope of collective action. This ambition is 
accomplished by systematically constituting ‘many centers of decision making, which are 
formally independent of each other’ and may either ‘function independently, or instead 
constitute an interdependent system’ (Ostrom, et al, 1961: 831; Frey, 2003). Since 
democratic preferences are diverse, the efficient scale for production of a particular good 
may or may not coincide with that desired by the members of a given jurisdiction.  For 
example, a large metropolitan government might achieve economies of scale in producing 
capital-intensive public goods, but at the expense of violating the preferences of some of its 
constituents and communities regarding whether and how much of those goods to provide. 
As Ostrom, et al (1961: 837) explain: 'the problem of gargantua…  is to recognise the variety 
of smaller sets of publics that may exist within its boundaries’.  
One way to accomplish that is by having households vote with their feet to choose among 
alternative, jurisdiction-based bundles of public goods (Tiebout, 1956). Another way, as we 
explore here, is to use an administrative solution by establishing an appropriate 
configuration of centres of decision making. Using the analytical distinction between 
provision and production makes it possible to design institutional arrangements that 
combine dispersed provision with large-scale production, or to have small-scale production 
serve a large population. At the same time, the existence of public governing institutions at 
larger scales is necessary in order to avoid (or compensate for) inter-jurisdictional spill-overs 
and to make appropriate redistribution possible. A polycentric design for institutional 
arrangements thus offers the possibility of simultaneously accomplishing both democracy 
and efficiency in public administration, by beginning with democracy and then finding ways 
efficiently to produce what democratic communities desire to provide for their members 
(Ostrom, 1989). 
The application of the polycentric principle to arm’s length governance can best be 
illustrated through a consideration of what in the US is termed ‘private government’: 
 Private governments . . . are those limited-purpose associations or organisations, 
usually voluntary in membership, which exist both alongside and subordinate to 
public governments. Private associations are considered governments when they 
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exhibit, to a significant extent, certain fundamental political characteristics….. [they] 
exercise power over both members and non-members, often in vital areas of 
individual and social concern. They make and apply rules affecting and limiting the 
behaviour of members [often with] well-developed systems of legislation, 
adjudication, and execution (Lakoff and Rich, 1973: 1). 
Examples from the US include business improvement districts (BIDs) and residential 
community associations (RCAs) – which are typically called homeowners associations 
(HOAs).  A recent example from England is the state sanctioning of free schools created and 
governed by self-organising groups of parents that operate in parallel to but with autonomy 
from the public education system. BIDs provide a useful way of examining this form of 
governance because of their widespread application outside the US.  In essence, a BID 
involves establishing a jurisdiction within which property owners and/or occupants pay a 
compulsory special assessment to finance the provision of services additional to those of the 
enclosing general-purpose local government (Justice and Goldsmith, 2008). The choice of 
services and allocation of cost shares is usually either actively determined by or at least 
acquiesced to by the assessment-paying constituents.  HOAs operate on a similar basis, 
providing collective goods such as refuse collection, security and environmental services for 
a defined residential development (McCabe, 2011).   
Helsley and Strange (1998) observe that private governments provide services additional to 
those that their members continue to pay for and receive from public governments, their 
costs being imposed only on members. In this respect, private governments become a 
logical part of the larger polycentric context in which the provision and production of public 
goods and services is undertaken by general public governments and specialist, member 
oriented private government.  Private governments become a matter of more-than-private 
concern when their decisions and actions have broader – one might say ‘public’ – 
implications. The now globally diffused BID, for example, typically provides some level of 
public space-management service as well as retail- and visitor-oriented services that might 
not be generally considered within the appropriate scope of private governments (Helsley 
and Strange, 1998; Hoyt, 2006; Mallett, 1993). 
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The democracy-enhancing potential of systematically applying a polycentric approach to the 
design of a system of public and private governments arises because it enables the specific 
needs of individuals and groups within a self-identifying community to be met while at the 
same time enabling that community to see itself in relation to others and to the wider 
polity.  Thus in theory, private governments offer both self-interested and other-regarding 
entities, joining efficiency and democracy in the near term while laying the foundations for 
future democratic participation and leadership.  In the case of BIDs, Baer and Marando 
(2001) suggest that they can foster desired democratic outcomes such as choice, efficiency 
and equity in collective-goods provision and financing because they allow local 
constituencies to agree to provide themselves with additional collective goods without 
having to leave their existing location or extract subsidies from other members of the larger 
jurisdiction. A corollary democracy enhancing benefit of private government is that they 
serve as training grounds for political engagement and leadership, as Ostrom (1993) argues 
in the case of the small US school districts prior to mid-20th century consolidation. 
Of course, the democracy enhancing potential of self-organised private governments 
operating at arm’s length to constitutionally legitimated public governments is not without 
its critics.  BIDs not only contribute to deepening democratic deficits by substituting private 
for public government, but also are internally undemocratic in a variety of ways. For 
example, some are managed by externally appointed or self-perpetuating boards and 
allocate votes among members other than through a one-person-one-vote arrangement 
(Blackwell, 2005; Council of the City of New York, 1995, 1997; Justice, 2003).  This may have 
consequences for their ability to comply with normative requirements of democratic public 
governments to ensure fairness and equity, conceivably impairing the wider civic 
infrastructure of local democracy (Justice and Skelcher, 2009).  In the future, the creation of 
private governments is likely to continue rather than to vanish. Facing this reality, a 
polycentric perspective at least offers a way forward by directing our attention to the 
democratic implications of specific designs and redesigns of individual institutional forms 
(Ysa, 2007) and configurations of institutions (Ostrom, 1980, 1990). Such a view frames 
institutional design as an affirmative form of societal problem solving rather than as an 
exercise in institutional isomorphism.  However, the democratic enhancing potential of 
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arm’s length governance is dependent not just on institutional design but also on the 
mobilisation of citizens to engage in democratic encounters beyond the ballot box. 
 
Activating citizens in arm’s length governance 
The democracy enhancing potential of polycentrism relies on citizens subscribing to the 
philosophy of civic republicanism (Frey, 1997).  Governments around the world are 
articulating the ambition to shift the default in decision-making towards citizens (e.g. 
NESTA, et al, 2012), and some of the potentialities and problems are illustrated in analyses 
of ‘democratic innovations’ (Smith, 2005), including participation (Barnes, et al, 2007), 
collaborative planning (Healey, 1997), democratic network governance (Sørensen and 
Torfing, 2007), deliberation (Dryzek, 2000; Fung, 2004), and co-production through 
sustained long-term relationships between organised groups of citizens and professionalised 
service providers (Bovaird, 2007; Joshi and Moore, 2003). 
Yet there is a persistent view that such activities involve the ‘usual suspects’ and are 
marginal or unrepresentative of a wider apathetic but ‘real’ citizenry (Bochel, et al, 2008; 
Durose, et al, 2009). Indeed, the UK-based Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement 
found a ‘disgruntled, disillusioned and disengaged public turning away from politics’ (2012: 
17) with the most recent assessment suggesting ‘a growth in the public’s indifference to 
politics’ (2013: 1). But, whilst there is a decreasing interest in traditional forms of political 
participation, the same Audit found ‘an underlying potential for participation that, for 
whatever reason, is not being realised’ (Hansard Society, 2013: 71; see also Diers, 2004). 
Notably, some 39% of respondents fell into the category of ‘latent’ or ‘standby’ participants, 
who are not currently actively engaged but might be persuaded to become so in the future 
(op cit, 73; Agger 2012). 
The institutional design of arm's length governance is crucial in motivating and mobilising 
citizens (John, 2009). But much of the literature on participation assumes an ‘invited’ 
approach where the terms and parameters are set by the state (Cornwall, 2004). The 
formalised nature of such ‘invited’ spaces often undermines the participative intent because 
they do not reflect how ordinary people want to engage. As Richardson highlights, ‘small-
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scale, informal activities are the most attractive to the majority’ (2011: 5; see also Lowndes, 
et al, 2006).  Thus: ‘given the competing demands on people’s time and evident concern 
about issue complexity and the efficacy of involvement, we can only expect and hope for 
episodic forms of participation when the circumstances warrant it’ (Hansard Society, 2013, 
71). Whilst state-centric approaches to participation feel like significant steps forward for 
government, they often do not represent a significant divestment of power, control or 
authority to citizens and indeed may present barriers to creating polycentric institutions 
(Richardson and Durose, 2013). As Arnstein highlights in her seminal work, 'there is a critical 
difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real 
power needed to affect the outcome of the process' (1969, 216). Indeed, there have been 
repeated criticisms about the extent and direction of divestment, whether elected 
representatives can ‘let go’ (Carr-West, Lucas and Thraves, 2011; Durose and Richardson, 
2009) and whether in doing so this represents democratic enhancement and empowerment 
of citizens or their co-option (McCulloch, 1997) and marginalisation (Beebeejaun and 
Grimshaw, 2011), or the further privatisation of the public sphere (Fuller and Geddes, 2008; 
Davies, 2012).  
Democracy enhancement through polycentrism requires a shift from ‘invited’ spaces to 
‘popular’ spaces (Cornwall, 1994) organised and led by citizens and with a focus on 
collaborative action and problem-solving (Stone, 1989). The drive for localism has 
repeatedly imagined the neighbourhood as a sphere for such self-organising (Smith, et al, 
2007). Such DIY community action is widely evident in the UK (Richardson, 2008) and 
elsewhere, but creative approaches to cultural change and well-resourced support are 
necessary to counter political resistance and incentivise people to get involved (Ostrom, 
1993; Smith, 2005; Durose, et al, 2013).  
A growing body of work has drawn attention to the role played by intermediaries in 
mobilising communities to organise around new forms of arm’s length governance 
(Newman, 2012). Historically, this work has been associated with community organisers 
(Alinsky, 1989a, b; Jamoul and Wills, 2008; Warren, 2009; Bunyan, 2010) and community 
development workers (Craig, 1989; Banks and Orton, 2007). But as front-line work in the 
public sector is increasingly focused on engaging with communities, greater emphasis has 
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been placed on the facilitative role of practitioners in local government and other public 
bodies, for example, as ‘civic entrepreneurs’ (Durose, 2009, 2011; van Hulst, et al, 2011, 
2012). With the impact of public budget reductions in some countries particularly affecting 
those on the peripheries of the public sector (Taylor, 2011), it is important to also recognise 
the ‘everyday maker’ (Bang and Sørensen, 1999; Li and Marsh, 2008): citizens who are able 
to build 'vital coalitions' to get things done and keep things going in and around the 
neighbourhood (Hendricks and Tops, 2005). Hendriks and Tops (2005, 486-487) identify a 
series of critical conditions required for such practice to be successful: pressure from below, 
which is ‘organised and articulated... by individuals who show initiative and who know how 
to mobilise and retain the commitment of people and organisations’; interpersonal co-
productive relationships; administrative backing and will to act in coalition for social change; 
and ‘room for manoeuvre’ so that people can operate outside existing norms of practice 
and ‘spot and seize chances’. 
Such citizen-led spaces for local organising and decision-making are a potential opportunity 
for democratic enhancement: autonomous from government, yet accountable (Fung, 2001). 
Rather than being dominated by the democratic mandate of elected representatives, such 
self-organising is premised on creating ‘public value’ (Moore, 1995; Blaug, Horner and Lehki, 
2006) through a relational accountability based on norms of social obligation (Hupe and Hill, 
2007) which recognises that public institutions ‘need to win consent, persuade, explain, 
share responsibility’ with citizens (Goss, 2001: 163). As Warren notes, ‘revitalising 
democracy requires effective connections between well-organised communities and our 
political system… new forms of mediating institutions are needed that can hold public 
institutions…accountable to communities’ (2001, cited in Diers, 2004, 11). 
 
Normative implications of arm’s length governance 
Our analysis illustrates how the classic model of state delegation to quasi-autonomous 
public agencies is part of a wider debate about the democratic qualities of arm’s length 
governance (Salamon, 1981).  Changing theoretical lenses from delegation to polycentrism 
requires us to rethink the uni-dimensional framework that has conventionally been applied 
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in analysing these institutions. Private government, with the possibility of self-organising 
communities being authorised by the state to undertake public functions, introduces the 
notion of functionally-organised collective activity through some form of membership 
organisation, echoing the economic theory of clubs within the public policy arena (Casella 
and Frey, 1992).  The mobilisation of citizens through the creation of structures within which 
they exercise authority engages with ideas of direct and deliberative democracy. These 
issues intersect with current theoretical, normative and empirical debates about the 
changing forms of democracy in the twenty-first century state, and its associated trans-
national and inter-jurisdictional arenas. 
The diverse of types of arm’s length governance present a set of theoretical and empirical 
challenges, demanding interdisciplinary approaches in order to identify, understand and 
explain the consequences for the political and managerial systems through which public 
policy is generated and realised.  Changing forms of identity, communication, and value 
create new pressures on multi-purpose systems of representative democracy and public 
bureaucracy.   
The development of a plurality of special purpose forms of government has wider 
implications for the organisation of the state (Skelcher, 2005). Such bodies are categorised 
by Hooghe and Marks (2002) as Type 2, in contrast to the Type 1 multi-purpose, spatially 
exclusive, and hierarchically ordered forms of government that currently tend to 
predominate.  It is clear that Type 2 jurisdictions can be of many forms. In the European 
literature, Frey (2003) explores these ideas in his conception of ‘functional, overlapping and 
competing jurisdictions’ (FOCJs). In systems of FOCJs, the individual has (to a degree) choice 
as to which governmental units they wish to belong and thus exercise their political rights.  
Yet in the absence of the larger constitutional and normative framework provided by 
representative democracy, a polycentric system has the potential to exacerbate and 
reinforce inequalities of status, wealth, income, and political power.  It may also encourage 
social as well as spatial withdrawal from the diversity of experience and interaction that 
constitutes one normative ideal of democracy. 
The democratic potential of arm’s length organisations is facilitated by the observation that 
the completeness of their design varies (Fung, 2003).  Some have formal governance 
14 
 
templates that specify exactly how the body is to operate.  This is particularly the case for 
agencies exercising regulatory or other adjudicative functions, where fair play needs to be 
demonstrated.  Other bodies, such as forms of citizen-centred, network and polycentric 
governance, are in a state of emergence from an initial incomplete design.  There are two 
virtues of incomplete design.  The first is that it has the potential to blur the distinction 
between ‘designers’ and ‘users’, leading to ‘a community of co-designers who inscribe their 
own contexts into the emergent design, thereby extending it on an ongoing basis in diverse 
and non-obvious ways’ (Garud, et al, 2008: 364).  As we demonstrate above, this can bring 
citizens, businesses and other stakeholders into a process of designing for collective 
decision-making.  Secondly, incomplete design is potentially generative of innovation and 
improvisation as actors mediate the relationship between extant structures and the external 
environment (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Weick, 2001).  It avoids the institutional stickiness of 
complete design (Pierson, 2002) and offers a better prospect of responding to changing 
policy problems and ideas and practices of democracy (Olsen, 1997).   
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Table 1: Functions of arm’s length bodies in international perspective 
Function Examples Role Governance 
Policy 
development 
European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights  
Expert advice to EU 
institutions/ member states  
Agency of the EU; board of independent experts 
appointed by Member States, European Commission 
and Council of Europe. 
Resource 
allocation 
Higher Education 
Funding Council for 
England    
Distributing public money for 
higher education  
Non-Departmental Public Body created by statute; 
board appointed by the minister; chair is subject to a 
pre-appointment hearing by Select Committee.   
Service delivery Transport Scotland Development/delivery of 
national transport projects 
and policies. 
Executive Agency of the Scottish Government; the 
Chief Executive is the Accountable Officer responsible 
to the Scottish Parliament for performance. 
Regulation Federal Communications 
Commission (USA)   
Standard-setting and 
enforcement. 
Federal  regulatory commission, created by the 
Communications Act of 1934; directed by five 
commissioners appointed by the president and 
confirmed by the Senate for five-year terms. 
Adjudication Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal (Australia)   
Independent review of 
administrative decisions. 
Tribunal or legally qualified or related experts, 
appointed by the Governor-General. 
Table
 Table 2: Two theoretical approaches to arm’s length governance 
Overall orientation State-centric  Citizen-centric 
Theoretical basis Delegation; agency theory Polycentrism; pluralism 
Principles Self-binding by politicians to enhance credible 
commitment against time inconsistent preferences 
Citizen/private actor self-organisation to meet 
specific needs and regulate behaviour of members 
Illustrative key 
authors 
Horn; Huber and Shipan  Elinor/Vincent Ostrom; Frey; Fung 
Examples Independent regulatory agencies; independent 
central banks; executive agencies 
Business improvement districts; non-state global 
regulators of professional/business standards; 
free/charter schools 
Democratic benefits Impartiality in rule application; secures long-term, 
societally beneficial policies; protects participation 
rights of marginalised actors 
Rule-making undertaken by affected parties; 
facilitates reorientation from self-interest to other-
regarding viewpoint; democratic training ground 
Democratic 
weaknesses 
Problems of information asymmetry, opportunism 
and guile on part of the agent; lacks compliance with 
Relies on active citizens/private actors to minimise 
autocracy; problems of reconciling plurality of 
governance standards applying to representative 
democratic institutions 
special purpose governments with overall societal 
governance; externalities may lead to inter-
jurisdictional conflict 
 
